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Abstract 
Equity crowdfunding is a relatively new phenomenon that allows non-professional investors to 
invest in potentially high-value startups. Although some view this as an opportunity to decrease 
societal inequalities, others are concerned that bloated valuations will leave investors with 
insufficient risk-adjusted returns. In our thesis, we sought to determine whether equity 
crowdfunded companies are overvalued. We compared company valuations on two Norwegian 
equity crowdfunding platforms to valuations in comparable Norwegian venture capital 
transactions using a Welch’s t-test across the two groups in their entirety as well as several t-
tests on defined subsets of these groups. 
Our results suggest that valuations on crowdfunding platforms are, on average, 44% to 52% 
higher than those professional investors face. We discuss these results in light of theory on 
startup valuation and agency theory and find a lack of arguments that could reasonably justify 
the difference in valuations. Hence, we conclude that crowdfunded companies appear to be 
overvalued. We suggest these overvaluations might be attributed to potential venture capital 
discounts and to the fact that startups listing on crowdfunding platforms can choose their own 
valuation, while the platforms lack incentives to negotiate this valuation on behalf of investors. 
Although overvalued companies imply that crowdfunding investors will achieve inferior risk-
adjusted returns compared to professional investors, further research on performance over time 
is needed to determine if this holds true. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Historically, investing in startups has been an activity reserved for professional investors, such 
as venture capital funds. In turn, access to these funds has normally been limited to wealthy 
individuals, family offices, and institutional investors. As investments in startups may yield 
exceptional returns, many have proclaimed that this restricted access represents an unfair 
advantage for the wealthy members of society (Night, 2018; Stockton, 2019). However, a new 
phenomenon has emerged in recent years, enabling non-professional investors to participate in 
the entrepreneurial finance sphere. This phenomenon is called equity crowdfunding. 
Crowdfunding is an umbrella term covering many different segments. There are five primary 
forms, which differ in terms of what the funders receive for their investment (Andersen & 
Mauritzen, 2016). Donation-based crowdfunding can most closely be described as a charitable 
donation where the investor does not receive anything tangible in return. In reward-based 
crowdfunding, investors receive rewards, such as early access or a discount on a product once 
it launches. Royalty crowdfunding provides the investor with cash flow rights once the firm 
reaches a certain stage. Debt-based crowdfunding platforms, such as Funding Partner in 
Norway, offer a credit contract. The last main form is equity crowdfunding, where the investors 
receive equity shares in the company. In this paper, we focus solely on equity crowdfunding, 
and hence, we use the term crowdfunding to refer to this specific type. 
Equity crowdfunding is a rather new phenomenon that first surfaced with the foundation of the 
Australian Small Scale Offerings Board in 2007 (World Bank, 2013). In 2012, Barack Obama 
signed the Jumpstart our Business Startups Act. The act opened up the opportunity for U.S. 
companies to raise external capital from the general public (SEC, 2017). Since then, equity 
crowdfunding has had massive growth. Suddenly, everyone with a few dollars to spare could 
invest and receive a share of the potentially astronomical returns successful companies can 
provide. From a societal perspective, one could argue that crowdfunding can serve as an 
important tool for staggering the growing financial inequalities in modern society (Stiglitz, 
2015). Furthermore, it allows startups to raise capital while simultaneously receiving feedback 
that people believe in their product or service offering. 
However, some have pointed out several issues in equity crowdfunding. Substantial 
information asymmetries between startups and crowdfunding investors are heavily debated 
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(Belleflamme et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2015; Courtney et al., 2017). Consequently, adverse 
selection is an issue that arises, where sceptics consider whether the startups choosing to list 
on crowdfunding platforms are of lower quality than those receiving funding from venture 
capitalists (VCs; Agrawal et al., 2014; Giudici et al., 2013; Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018a). We 
elaborate on these agency theory issues in our literature review. 
Some successful companies have originated from crowdfunding platforms, one of the most 
notable being the fintech venture Revolut. Allowing private investors access to these high-
potential new ventures simultaneously gives them access to the matching returns. However, 
financial literature emphasizes the importance of adjusting for risk when comparing 
investments across different asset classes, and the risk-return profile of crowdfunding has yet 
to be explored. 
One important determinant of investment returns is the valuation at which one invests. On most 
crowdfunding platforms, startups decide the company valuation themselves, and investors have 
no way of negotiating this price; they either invest or not. Here, the decision of each individual 
investor makes little difference in the grand scheme of things. In stark contrast, professional 
VC funds are arguably better able to both assess a fair value for the company and negotiate an 
appropriate valuation. Some have claimed that these mechanisms lead crowdfunded companies 
to be greatly overvalued in equity offerings (Lalacos, 2020; Vasconcelos, 2015). 
If crowdfunded companies are overvalued, investing in startups through crowdfunding would, 
on average, not yield the same risk-adjusted returns as investing through VC funds. Hence, 
crowdfunding would not represent a novel way for the average investor to attain the superior 
returns previously reserved for the wealthy members of society. On the contrary, it could 
merely serve as a channel for poor-quality startups to lure funding from uneducated investors. 
The current literature on equity crowdfunding is very limited. On the topic of potentially 
overvalued crowdfunded companies, we found no prior empirical research. The lack of prior 
research and its potentially important implications for private investors motivated us to choose 
this specific topic for our master’s thesis. 
1.2 Research Question 
With the purpose of safeguarding private investors’ best interests, the aim of this thesis is to 
pursue this research question: 
Are crowdfunded companies overvalued? 
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We sought to determine this by comparing the valuations of crowdfunded companies to those 
of their VC-backed peers. Our research rests on the assumption that startups seeking 
investments through crowdfunding are similar to those that seek funding from VCs. We aimed 
to compare companies at the same stage of development. 
1.3 Outline 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide a review of 
relevant current literature on venture capital, startup valuation, and equity crowdfunding. In 
Chapter 3, we elaborate on the process of collecting and processing data before describing our 
statistical approach. The results of our analysis are presented in Chapter 4 and discussed in 
light of theoretical concepts in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we conclude our findings. 
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2 Literature Review 
In the following sections, we first briefly describe the players in entrepreneurial finance. 
Second, we touch upon current literature on important aspects of startup valuation in general. 
Finally, we piece together the limited existing literature on equity crowdfunding, emphasizing 
how differences in market dynamics and investor traits might affect valuations. 
2.1 Players in Entrepreneurial Finance 
According to the pecking order theory of capital structure, any company would first seek to use 
internal financing, such as retained earnings, to finance new investments. If these funds are not 
available or sufficient, the company will issue debt or, as a last resort, equity (Myers, 1984). 
New ventures often have negative earnings and cash flows, which leave them with no other 
option than to raise capital from risk-willing investors. The major players in startup investing 
are VCs and business angels (BAs; Block et al., 2018). VC funds generate profits by selecting 
ventures with high potential of succeeding, making term sheets that incentivize the 
entrepreneurs to pursue value-creating activities and providing the support that maximizes the 
valuation of their portfolio companies (Gifford, 1998). 
The partners of a VC firm, also known as general partners (GPs), manage the fund and are 
responsible for investment decisions and following up on the portfolio companies (Gifford, 
1998). Those who invest in a VC fund are called limited partners (LPs). These investors 
compensate the GPs, usually by paying both a management fee and carried interest. The 
management fee is an annual percentage of the LPs’ committed capital. The carried interest is 
a performance fee, stating the GPs’ portion of the fund’s returns after the LPs’ initial 
investments have been returned (Gifford, 1998). The most common fee structure is the ‘2 and 
20’, with a 2% management fee and 20% carried interest (Mulcahy et al., 2012). 
In addition to selecting and deploying capital to new ventures with high market potential, VCs 
support startups through value-adding activities. The level of support differs, and Teten et al. 
(2013) list three distinct categories of VCs based on their level of support – financiers, mentors, 
and portfolio operators. They found that most VCs fall into the category of mentors. This is in 
line with the research of Ehrlich et al. (1994), who found that VCs in general have a supporting 
role in monitoring, serving as a sounding board, and formulating business strategies. On the 
other hand, investors in equity crowdfunding can be considered financiers, as their only 
contribution is capital. Some scholars report that VC support has a positive impact on investee 
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companies (Flynn & Forman, 2001) and that VC involvement is positively correlated with 
successful exits (Bernstein, 2016). In addition to value-adding activities, having a highly 
reputable VC firm on the capitalization table can be a value-add itself (Large & Muegge, 2008), 
as this can provide a signal of high quality. 
BAs are another type of investor startups typically target when seeking external capital. BAs 
are wealthy individuals who invest directly in startups at an early stage (Mason & Harrison, 
2015). They invest their personal assets, often accumulated through their own entrepreneurial 
ventures (Ramadani, 2009). Like VCs, BAs often take an active role by supporting startups as 
sounding boards and helping to develop business strategies (Politis, 2008). As VCs and BAs 
are such similar types of investors, we group them together when comparing them to 
crowdfunding investors under the umbrella term VCs in the remainder of our thesis. 
VCs demand high returns for the risk they undertake. From 1960 to 1999, VC investments 
yielded an arithmetic return of 45% annually with a standard deviation of 115.6% (Baierl & 
Kaplan, 2002). Cochrane (2005) suggests several reasons why the risk-return ratio differs from 
public stocks. Other than the uncertainty of returns, he mentions illiquidity and that a larger 
fraction of total capital is often invested in each company. The latter implies higher risk through 
lower diversification. The risk-return profiles of different asset classes are depicted in Figure 
1. With investment characteristics similar to those found in VC, we should expect to also find 
the risk-return ratio of equity crowdfunding close to that of VC. 
Figure 1: Illustrative risk-return profiles for different asset classes 
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Venture capital exhibits a power-law distribution of returns (Thiel & Masters, 2014), meaning 
that relatively few VC deals yield the majority of the returns. Crawford et al. (2015) found fat-
tail distributions in many entrepreneurial success criteria. For instance, 0.03% of all new 
ventures generated 60% of the total jobs in their sample, and they found similar distributions 
in revenues and growth. A natural symptom of a power-law distribution is that the mean is 
significantly higher than the median, driven by outliers. Consequently, the power law implies 
that even though returns may seem attractive on average, the overall probability of success is 
low and involves great risks. It seems reasonable to assume that returns in equity crowdfunding 
follow the same distribution. 
2.2 Startup Valuation 
According to financial theory, the value of any company or investment is the present value of 
the cash flows it will generate over its lifetime (Brealey & Myers, 2002). Among financial 
analysts, the dominant valuation techniques are the multiples and discounted cash flows 
methods (Demirakos et al., 2004). However, startup valuation is a different process, due to 
greater uncertainties in future outcomes. The traditional valuation methods require forecasts of 
revenues and costs and assumptions of growth. These assumptions and projections are built on 
historical accounting information (Ou & Penman, 1989), which new companies lack. Thus, 
startup valuations can vary greatly based on the evaluators’ judgement and are highly driven 
by hypotheses of what a future world will look like (Miloud et al., 2012). The research of Levie 
and Gimmon (2008), Dominguez (1974), and Sudek (2007) supports the notion that there is 
extensive use of gut feeling and intuition among VCs. Hence, these investors might make 
systematic errors that could lead to over- or undervaluation of new ventures. Therefore, 
psychological theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and theories of bounded rationalities 
(Simon, 1955) are important in startup valuation. Based on previous research and their own 
qualitative studies, Levie and Gimmon (2008) proposed a model of how VCs execute 
suboptimal investments due to information asymmetries in the investment process (Figure 2). 
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Presumably, crowdfunding investors go through the same process, but the information 
asymmetries are even higher (Ahlers et al., 2015), thus increasing the risk of suboptimal 
investments. Since cognitive biases are such a prevalent topic in the industry, professional 
investors might be more aware of systematic errors and, consequently, less prone to be affected 
by them. 
As the most common valuation techniques are ill-suited for startup valuation, new variants 
have been introduced, such as the VC method and the First Chicago method (Festel et al., 
2013). Metrick and Yasuda (2011) refer to the VC method as ‘the most common valuation 
strategy used by venture capitalists’ (p. 178). In practice, this method relies on a financial 
forecast to calculate the future exit value if the venture succeeds. The exit value is found by 
using either fundamental valuation techniques or, maybe more commonly, multiples valuations 
of comparable exits. The exit value is discounted by a rate considerably larger than the average 
cost of capital for public companies. The weighted average cost of capital and capital asset 
pricing model use risk-free rates, average market return, and a measure of volatility, or beta, to 
derive the discount rate (Jensen et al., 1972; Miller & Modigliani, 1963). On the other hand, 
the VC method calculates the discount rate based on an estimated probability of successful exit, 
the expected time to exit, and the portfolio’s overall cost of capital (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, 
p. 180–181). If we let p denote the probability of a successful exit, the value of a startup 
company today should be given by the following equation: 




Figure 2: Conceptual model explaining suboptimal investment decisions in venture capital 
markets (Levie & Gimmons, 2008) 
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where 𝑟𝑉𝐶 denotes the cost of venture capital and p/(1+𝑟𝑉𝐶)
T describes the effective discount 
factor for the exit valuation. 
One study found that a startup’s product or solution and human capital are the most crucial 
factors for successful entrepreneurship (Bosma et al., 2000). At an early stage, there might not 
be a finished product or service to evaluate. This is likely why many scholars find that the 
founding team’s quality is the most important selection criterion when VCs invest (Nunes et 
al., 2014; Silva, 2004). This criterion is based on the notion that a high-quality founding team 
can adapt to emerging challenges, hence increasing the startup’s probability of success. 
2.3 Equity Crowdfunding 
The research on equity crowdfunding is still in its infancy. In general, many research questions 
are left unanswered, as there is a lack of data on the historical performance of crowdfunded 
companies. In parallel with increased attention on this topic, the accumulation of data from 
crowdfunding platforms across the globe will lead to a broader and more in-depth 
understanding of equity crowdfunding and its role in future financial markets. To the best of 
our knowledge, the direct research on valuations on crowdfunding platforms is virtually non-
existent. We therefore review literature on the underlying dynamics of equity crowdfunding 
and how these might explain differences in valuations between crowdfunded and VC-backed 
companies. 
From the perspective of capital markets, there is an extensive debate on whether equity 
crowdfunding is a ‘market for lemons’ due to the information asymmetries between investors 
and startups (Mochkabadi & Volkmann, 2020). The entrepreneurial finance literature has 
discussed the challenge of information asymmetries in traditional venture capital for decades 
(Cumming, 2006; Fiet, 1995; Trester, 1998), and Ahlers et al. (2015) argue that information 
asymmetries are even greater in crowdfunding. This issue has the potential to cause market 
failure (Agrawal et al., 2014). 
The ‘lemons problem’ in agency theory is a metaphor for a situation where only the seller 
possesses information on the product’s real value. The buyer, who cannot distinguish between 
low- and high-quality products, discounts the value of all products. Hence, high-quality 
products will not receive a fair price and will eventually exit the market, leaving only poor-
quality products in the market pool (Akerlof, 1978). Given a situation where both high- and 
low-quality entrepreneurs utilize crowdfunding, a lemons problem could arise if information 
asymmetries are so great that unwitting investors flood the market with money. This could 
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skew valuations so that the high-quality startups cannot distinguish themselves from the low-
quality ones (Ibrahim, 2015). 
To further support this notion of a market for lemons, the research of Walthoff-Borm et al. 
(2018b) shows that firms listed on crowdfunding platforms are more likely to have excessive 
debt levels and are less profitable than comparable firms not listed on these platforms. A partner 
of a law firm specializing in venture deals wrote in a commentary that startups raising capital 
through crowdfunding might signal that they have been passed over for investments by VC 
firms and BAs. Furthermore, he states that previous crowdfunding might deter professional 
investors later (Roberts, 2015). A qualitative study on entrepreneurs who had used 
crowdfunding platforms to raise equity supports this statement. Most of the entrepreneurs 
sought VC funding at first, but after being denied, they moved on to crowdfunding (Langgård 
& Mostad, 2015). This implies that companies raising funds through crowdfunding are of 
poorer quality than those who raise through professional investors and should, consequently, 
have lower valuations. In the same study, respondents claimed that one benefit of equity 
crowdfunding was that one could achieve a higher valuation. Agrawal et al. (2014) support the 
idea that some entrepreneurs view crowdfunding as a cheap source of capital. 
A central part of agency theory relates to the incentives of different stakeholders. Both the 
Norwegian crowdfunding platforms have a two-component revenue model; they both charge a 
fixed campaign cost and a percentage fee of the raised amount (Dealflow, 2020; Folkeinvest, 
2020). It is worth noting that neither of these fees depend on the future success of the startup. 
As the crowdfunding platforms have no incentive to promote only high-quality companies, 
they face a moral hazard situation where the goal is to achieve funding for the companies 
regardless of their quality. Their incentives, in other words, do not align with those of investors. 
When VCs do their due diligence, they normally meet with the founding team several times. 
This allows for a thorough assessment of the team and an extraction of comprehensive details 
on the company. While crowdfunding investors also emphasize the management’s motivation 
and commitment as critical investment factors (Shafi, 2019), they are not able to assess these 
with the same level of scrutiny as a VC. If the lack of proper due diligence deters investors, 
this can lead to market failure, resulting in high-quality entrepreneurs not receiving funding. 
However, the investors might discount the informational asymmetries, leading to a lower 
company valuation (Agrawal et al., 2014). Since information on the founding team is essential 
in VC investing, the fact that crowdfunding does not allow for face-to-face communication 
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limits the investors’ understanding of the entrepreneurs’ motivation, knowledge, and 
trustworthiness (Agrawal et al., 2016). 
An issue that Tomboc (2013) raises is that entrepreneurs who seek crowdfunding investments 
may be reluctant to share detailed information about their solution or product due to fear of 
intellectual property theft. Traditionally, when entrepreneurs pitch to professional investors, 
the parties sign nondisclosure agreements that prevent or reduce the risk that investors will 
exploit the entrepreneurs’ ideas. Creating these agreements for large crowds is very 
challenging, both in terms of practical implementation and follow-up. 
When researching how information asymmetry affects companies’ market value, Agarwal et 
al. (2016) found that companies with higher quality investor relations strategies and lower 
information asymmetries are rewarded with higher valuation multiples. As this study is 
conducted on publicly traded companies, we are careful to draw a close parallel to the 
information asymmetries related to equity crowdfunding. Although, it seems reasonable to 
assume that information asymmetries could also negatively impact the valuations of 
crowdfunded companies. Research on the relationship between information asymmetries and 
successful exits in VC-backed firms shows that when asymmetries are mitigated, the 
probability of a successful exit increases (Cumming & Johan, 2008). 
Returning to the VC method, there is a question of whether crowdfunding investors have 
different criteria for returns than professional investors (Belleflamme et al., 2013). 
Bretschneider and Leimester (2017) found that crowdfunding investors exhibited prosocial 
investment behaviour. One example of prosocial motivation is community benefits. 
Belleflamme et al. (2014) argue that crowdfunding investors experience community benefits 
that increase their perceived value. One can argue that these benefits only apply to enterprises 
that can create communities for their products, predominantly covering the business-to-
consumer segment (Roma et al., 2017). Examples of such companies are Revolut and 
BrewDog, which both became unicorns. These community benefits might reduce the investors’ 
discount rate, as they gain utility from nonmonetary sources other than investment returns. This 
will in turn increase company valuations. 
The wisdom of the crowd is one argument in support of equity crowdfunding (Polzin et al., 
2018). As each investor normally only invests a small amount, a large number of investors 
must invest for the campaign to be successful. This could imply that information asymmetries 
are reduced and only the high-quality companies receive funding. However, investors might 
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take previous funding as a signal of quality and choose to invest for that reason. Agrawal et al. 
(2014) found that the attraction for investors increases with accumulated capital and that 
successfully funded campaigns are highly skewed. Hence, the accumulation of investors and 
funding amounts could have a positive signalling effect leading to ‘group-think’, which, in 
turn, increases information asymmetries (Tomboc, 2013). 
One notable study found no significant relationship between financial potential and successful 
campaigns (Shafi, 2019). If private investors ignore financial potential when making their 
investment decisions, they might also neglect to consider the valuation at which they invest. 
To synthesize, the current literature on equity crowdfunding highlights several issues 
concerning the quality of the startups listing on crowdfunding platforms, such as informational 
asymmetries and adverse selection. If crowdfunded startups truly are of lower quality, they 
would be overvalued even if they are priced at similar valuations as their VC-backed peers. 
However, in our analysis, we seek to determine if they attain statistically significantly higher 
valuations. 
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3 Method 
3.1 Data Collection 
To compare valuations of companies that raised funding through equity crowdfunding and 
those that raised funding through VCs, we had to create data sets for the two groups. In the 
following, we elaborate on this process. 
3.1.1 Crowdfunding Data 
We extracted data from 142 crowdfunding campaigns on the websites dealflow.no and 
folkeinvest.no (Dealflow N = 62, Folkeinvest N = 80). Each campaign provided details 
regarding the company and the deal proposals, including a pre-money valuation and target 
amount to be raised through the campaign. The target amount was listed as a range, such as 
NOK 1–3 million. For the companies that did not meet their campaign’s minimum target before 
the deadline (Dealflow n = 16, Folkeinvest n = 34), the campaign was cancelled. The data from 
these campaigns was not included in the dataset, as we deemed it wrong to include deals that 
did not occur. Of the remaining companies (n = 92), where the campaign was successful, we 
excluded companies that were more than ten years old at the time of the campaign (n = 9). We 
did this because these companies are no longer considered startups by normal standards. This 
left us with 83 observations of crowdfunding transactions. 
3.1.2 Venture Capital Data – Creating the Benchmark 
To create a benchmark of comparable VC-backed startups, we compiled transaction data from 
a group of BAs and three different Norwegian VCs investing at the pre-seed and seed stages. 
We received data on a total of 154 transactions (n = 6, 13, 37, 98 from the different funds). We 
removed observations where the investments were made through convertible notes (n = 46), 
effectively postponing the valuations of the startups until the next round of funding, often not 
available in the data. Furthermore, we deleted one observation containing incohesive data. This 
left us with 107 observations (n = 6, 13, 33, 55 from the different funds). The data was 
anonymized, revealing only historical data on the VCs’ investment amounts, total investment 
(if more than one investor involved), and equity stakes. From this, we could derive the pre-
money valuations used for comparison with the crowdfunding group. 
Note that the VCs did not wish to share data on other characteristics, such as industry or product 
category, as this could enable us to reasonably pinpoint which valuation belonged to each 
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portfolio company. Hence, giving this information would require permission from each 
individual company, which most would be reluctant to give. The lack of this information 
represents a disadvantage, as we cannot control for these variables, which might hide 
systematic differences between the crowdfunded and VC-backed companies. However, 
scarcity of data is a known problem in the industry, limiting researchers’ ability to be pedantic 
on this matter. 
3.2 The Challenge of Defining Startup Stage Categories 
Among the remaining crowdfunded companies in our sample, there was a large range in how 
much capital the companies had raised prior to the crowdfunding campaign. Data on previous 
funding was extracted from public accounting reports from proff.no and investment notes on 
the crowdfunding platforms. Arguably, companies that had previously raised NOK 15 million 
might not be comparable to companies that had only raised NOK 30 thousand, as these were 
likely at different stages. The company stage is an important factor, as the younger the company 
is in its life cycle, the greater the risk and, consequently, the lower the valuation (Ruhnka & 
Young, 1991). 
After ‘friends, family, and fools’, the first round of professional funding has traditionally been 
the seed round, prior to series A, which is the first round in the growth phase of the startup’s 
life cycle. However, as the size of seed investments grew, a new funding stage emerged: pre-
seed (Kumar, 2017). The lines separating these categories are, however, quite blurry. 
Most of the crowdfunded companies (64%) listed their campaign within the first three years of 
existence and were arguably at an early stage of development. Hence, they are likely to fall 
into the pre-seed or seed category. However, a number of factors other than funding determine 
what stage a startup company is at, such as product development stage, whether the company 
has paying customers, and the number of users. Furthermore, these criteria vary greatly across 
different industries, as do the capital needs. For example, a software company can launch a 
minimally viable product without much capital at all, while hardware companies might drain 
several million in capital just developing a prototype. Consequently, it is impossible to 
accurately divide startups into pre-seed or seed stage groups based solely on their funding. Yet 
as we only have data on transaction amounts and valuations, we must make an attempt. 
What further complicates the matter is the lack of industry-wide definitions of what 
characterizes and distinguishes the different stages. A GP at a VC firm we spoke to stated that 
‘It is a challenge that the industry cannot seem to agree on clear definitions of the different 
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stages. Different actors in the market use the terms pre-seed and seed at least partially 
interchangeably, blurring the border between these stages’. This becomes evident when 
searching for funding characteristics of the pre-seed stage. Some state that U.S. pre-seed rounds 
typically range between $50K and $250K in investment amount at $1–3 million valuations 
(Lynley, 2019), while others claim they normally range from $500K to $750K (Kumar, 2017). 
A prominent Norwegian BA we spoke to said the typical Norwegian pre-seed investment lies 
around NOK 3–5 million at valuations near NOK 30 million. On the other hand, StartupLab, 
Norway’s largest player in early-stage investments, says on their website that they usually 
invest NOK 1–3 million at valuations between NOK 10–30 million (StartupLab, 2020). 
To achieve accurate results in our analysis, we need to compare companies that are at a similar 
stage – to compare apples to apples, so to speak. The problem arises when it is nearly 
impossible to determine whether a company is an apple, a pear, or something in between. 
Hence, in our analysis, there is no sure-fire way to group the companies. Thus, we ran a total 
of four tests. In the first two tests, we did not separate the companies into stages but instead 
tested the full samples. In the last two tests, we defined thresholds between pre-seed and later 
stages. These thresholds are based on discussions with several VC partners and BAs. We 
acknowledge the challenges of this simplified approach, but as an optimal approach seems 
unattainable, we believe it can still reveal valuable insights into this novel industry. 
3.2.1 Test 1: All Companies Included 
In the first test, we included all the companies from both groups (crowdfunding, N = 83; VC, 
N = 107). This was to determine if there is a significant difference in valuations prior to 
alterations in the data set. Although these alterations are intended to improve the quality of the 
analysis, they are based on the authors’ best judgments. Hence, they might be biased – or even 
simply wrong. 
3.2.2 Test 2: Excluding the Top 5% 
In the second test, we excluded the observations comprising the top 5% of pre-money 
valuations in both groups. This left us with 79 observations in the crowdfunding group and 102 
observations in the VC group. This was done in an attempt to avoid the (sometimes extreme) 
outliers one sees within entrepreneurial finance, as these might skew the averages and lead to 
substantially increased variability. The average pre-money valuation in the top 5% was NOK 
82 million in the crowdfunded group and NOK 64 million in the VC group. The reason we 
observe these high valuations might be due to VC investors sometimes investing outside their 
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mandate, meaning a pre-seed or seed investor might sometimes participate in a series A round. 
Similarly, while most companies listing on crowdfunding platform are new ventures, there are 
a few more mature companies listing as well, skewing the average valuations. We believe 
excluding these observations leaves us with a more representative sample. Hence, we also 
excluded them in the remaining tests. 
3.2.3 Test 3: Pre-seed I 
In this test, we defined a threshold to distinguish companies at the pre-seed stage from those at 
the seed or later stages. Companies that have not yet raised a pre-seed round are normally 
funded by the savings of the founders, their families and friends, and smaller governmental 
grants. For the crowdfunded companies, we set an upper limit of funding prior to the campaign 
at NOK 1.5 million. It seems reasonable to assume that the vast majority of companies that had 
raised less than this amount prior to the campaign were at a pre-seed stage. Thus, companies 
below this threshold are defined as being in the pre-seed category. This was the case for 45 out 
of 79 companies. For the VC-backed companies, we defined pre-seed rounds as rounds with 
less than NOK 5 million in investment amount (n = 66). Companies with investment amounts 
above this (n = 36) were defined as being in the seed or later stage category. 
Test 3.1 compares the pre-money valuations in the defined pre-seed groups of crowdfunded 
and VC-backed companies. Although the companies in the groups above the defined thresholds 
could be at different stages, we included a supplementary test (3.2) comparing these groups as 
well. We did this because our defined pre-seed groups are based merely on best judgements. 
Hence, including a comparison of the remaining observations seemed reasonable. 
3.2.4 Test 4: Pre-seed II 
As Norwegian startups can receive grants from the governmental organization Innovasjon 
Norge of up to NOK 1.5M, one might argue that setting the threshold at NOK 1.5 million is 
too low to encapsulate the entire pre-seed stage. Hence, we also ran tests where we set the 
threshold higher. We increased the upper limit for prior investments to NOK 3 million for 
crowdfunded companies. As this likely includes companies at the upper range of the pre-seed 
stage, we adjusted the maximum investment amount to NOK 7 million for the VC-backed 
companies to include the upper range of VC pre-seed transactions as well. This increased the 
pre-seed groups of the crowdfunding and VC groups to 57 and 83 observations, respectively. 
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Analogous to test 3.1, test 4.1 compares the new pre-seed groups of crowdfunded and VC-
backed companies, while test 4.2 compares companies defined to be at later stages. 
3.3 Statistical Approach 
With the purpose of testing differences in valuations between crowdfunding and VC 
transactions, we based our analysis on an independent sample t-test. This test helped us in 
suggesting an answer to whether crowdfunded companies are overvalued. 
We conducted a Welch’s t-test (Welch, 1938), which is the most robust independent sample t-
test in the case of unequal sample sizes or variances within the groups (Zimmerman & Zumbo, 
1993). The test provides the same answer as the corresponding test assuming equal variance, 
though it has a hedge in case the assumption is violated (Delacre et al., 2017). 
To derive the t-statistic, we found the difference between the means of the two groups and 
divided it by the sum of the standard deviations for the two groups. 
 
𝑡 =











To determine the degrees of freedom, we used the Welch-Satterthwaite equation (Satterthwaite, 
1946). The equation returns the effective degrees of freedom in case of unequal variance 




























One assumption for the Welch’s t-test is normality in variances for both groups. For the purpose 
of the t-test, we assumed the observations to be normally distributed if skewness is <|2,0| and 
kurtosis is <|9,0|. Within these limits, the test are considered robust, with a low probability of 
a type 1 error (Schmider et al., 2010). If the two groups are skewed in the same direction, a 
violation of the normality assumption is less of an issue (Gignac, 2019). 
As power-law distributions are frequently featured in entrepreneurial finance, we might find 
this relationship within our data samples. Its implication for the Welch t-test is that the 
probability of a type 1 error, rejecting a valid null hypothesis, increases. However, this issue 
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has two valid solutions: (i) log-transform the variables to normalize the data, or (ii) use a 
nonparametric test, which does not require normally distributed observations. We executed 
solution (i) by logging the observations within both groups (Wooldridge, 2013, p.120), then 
we retested the normality assumption and repeated the Welch’s t-test. 
For solution (ii), we used a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test, which is robust to non-
equal variance and non-normality (Fligner & Policello, 1981). The test compares the medians 
instead of the means, but the implications of the test results are equal to those of the Welch’s 
t-test. We employed this test as a supplement to the Welch’s t-test in case of any major 
violations of assumptions.  
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4 Results 
All the following results are denominated in MNOK. In the full sample, test 1, crowdfunded 
companies (ECF; N = 83) had an average valuation of NOK 25.577 million (SD = 20.369). The 
full sample of VC-backed companies (VC; N = 107) had a smaller numerical valuation (M = 
17.409, SD = 13.652). The assumption of normality in the observations was violated for the 
full sample VC data, as skewness exceeded the limits of < |2,0| and kurtosis of < |9,0| (Schmider 
et al., 2010). Therefore, we log-transformed the full-sample variables to normalize the 
distributions. The full-sample test of the logged variables showed that valuations for 
crowdfunded companies were statistically significantly higher (p<0.01) than the valuations of 
VC-backed companies, t(172.62) = 2.73, p = 0.004.  
Test 2 excluded the top 5% observations from both groups. Here, crowdfunded companies (n 
= 79) had a somewhat reduced valuation (M = 22.756, SD = 15.659). A similar reduction was 
observed for VC-backed companies (n = 102, M = 15.136, SD = 8.541). We note that there 
was a relatively even reduction in valuation in both groups and that the standard deviations 
dropped substantially. In line with test 1, test 2 found higher valuations for crowdfunded 
companies, t(113.44) = 3.90, p = 0.000 (p<0.01). 
Both valuations were further reduced in test 3.1, where we tried to isolate companies at the 
pre-seed stage. Crowdfunded companies with prior funding less than NOK 1.5 million (n = 
45) had an average valuation of 16.949 (SD = 12.749) compared to VC transactions smaller 
than NOK 5 million (n = 66, M = 11.160, SD = 5.430). This test also shows statistical 
significance for crowdfunded companies being valued higher than comparable VC 
transactions, t(54.99) = 2.87, p = 0.003. To check the state of the valuations above the 
threshold, we did a test on these groups as well. In test 3.2, crowdfunded companies also had 
higher valuations than the group of VC transactions (ECF over1.5 M: n = 34, M = 30.442, SD 
= 15.999; VC over5M: n = 36, M = 22.424, SD = 8.447). The test was significant (p<0.01) 
with properties t(49.43) = 2.60, p = 0.006. 
Test 4.1, the second attempt to isolate companies at the pre-seed stage, where the thresholds 
were increased to 3M prior funding for crowdfunding and 7M investment amount for VC-
backed companies, also yielded statistically significant results (p<0.01). Crowdfunding (n = 
57) had an average of NOK 18.818 million (SD = 13.731) while VC transactions (n = 83) 
showed an average of 13.078 (SD = 7.144). The test properties were t(54.99) = 2.87, p = 0.003. 
Results  19 
 
Test 4.2 also showed that crowdfunded companies had higher valuation than the group of VC 
transactions (ECF over3M: n = 22, M = 32.959, SD = 16.484; VC over7M: n = 19, M = 
24.126, SD = 8.487). These results were statistically significant, t(32.31) = 2.20, p = 0.017. 
The descriptive statistics are found in Table 1, and the results from Welch’s t-test are found in 
Table 2 below. 
Table 1: Descriptive valuation statistics 
Valuation Statistics in MNOK  
Variable name N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
min max skewness Kurtosis 
 All Valuation 190 20.977 15.996 17.351 0.882 118.274 2.1 9.1 
 ECF ALL 83 25.577 20.000 20.369 3.000 118.274 1.6 6.9 
 ECF ex5perc 79 22.756 19.961 15.659 3.000 62.190 0.8 2.7 
 ECF under1.5M 45 16.949 15.000 12.749 3.000 55.000 1.1 3.8 
 ECF over1.5M 34 30.442 26.817 15.999 6.516 62.190 0.4 1.9 
 ECF under3M 57 18.818 17.746 13.731 3.000 59.268 1.2 4.1 
 ECF over3M 22 32.959 31.422 16.484 6.516 62.190 0.0 1.9 
 ECF_unsuccessful 34 26.784 19.281 24.261 2.498 102.460 1.5 4.9 
 VC ALL 107 17.409 13.500 13.652 0.882 90.000 2.5 11.6 
 VC ex5perc 102 15.136 13.391 8.542 0.882 46.150 0.9 4.3 
 VC under5M 66 11.160 10.962 5.430 0.882 24.442 0.2 3.1 
 VC over 5M 36 22.424 21.696 8.447 9.043 46.150 0.7 3.5 
 VC under7M 83 13.078 12.000 7.144 0.882 40.000 1.0 4,9 
 VC over 7M 19 24.126 24.049 8.487 9.043 46.150 0.7 3.1 
 Inv.Amount ECF 78 2.357 2.061 1.897 0.250 12.396 0.8 2.9 
 Inv.Amount VC 102 4.365 3.028 4.229 0.200 25.294 2.2 9.4 
 logECF ALL 83 16.737 16.811 0.854 14.914 18.589 -0.3 2.4 
 logVC ALL 107 16.407 16.418 0.796 13.690 18.315 -0.9 5.2 
 
Table 2: Welch’s t-test 
Welch’s t-test for independent samples 
Test |t-stat| df p - value diff in mean Std. Err. Cohen's D3 
Test 1: Full sample1 2.73 169.96 0.004*** 0.331 0.121 0.402 
Test 2: Excluding outliers 3.90 113.44 0.000*** 7.720 1.954 0.736 
Test 3.1: Pre-Seed I 2.87 54.99 0.003*** 5.789 2.015 0.635 
Test 3.2: Pre-Seed I (above thresholds) 2.60 49.43 0.006*** 8.019 3.089  
Test 4.1: Pre-Seed II 2.94 77.57 0.002*** 5.741 1.956 0.498 
Test 4.2: Pre-Seed II (above thresholds) 2.20 32.31 0.017** 8.832 4.018  
Supplementary I:  Investment amount1 3.81 176.60 0.000*** -0.505 0.133  
Supplementary II: Successful1 0.31 55.91 0.7552 0.057 0.181   
*** = p<0.01 (1-sided test)     
** = p<0.05 (1-sided test)     
1 = Log-transformed variables, 2 = 2-sided test, 3 = include only effect size for main tests   
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We also conducted Fligner-Policello robust rank order tests (Fligner & Policello, 1981). These 
tests supported the finding that valuations in crowdfunding are higher than valuations for VC-
backed companies, U = 2.795, p = 0.003 for test 1, U = 3.941, p = 0.000 for test 2. For the 
pre-seed isolation tests, we retrieved the properties U = 2.072, p = 0.019 and U = 1.681, p = 
0.046, respectively. The test suggests that the median is significantly higher for crowdfunding 
valuations. However, we noticed that the results for test 3 and test 4 are somewhat weaker. 
These are not significant to 1% as they were with the Welch’s t-tests. Results can be found in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Fligner-Policello robust rank order test 
Fligner-Policello robust rank order test 
Test U-stat 1-tailed asymptotic p-value 
Test 1: Full sample 2.795 0.003*** 
Test 2: Excluding outliers 3.941 0.000*** 
Test 3: Pre-Seed I 1.681 0.046** 
Test 4: Pre-Seed II 2.072 0.019** 
*** = p<0.01 
** = p<0.05 
 
As a supplement, we wanted to test if there were differences in valuations between successful 
and unsuccessful crowdfunding campaigns (n = 34). The unsuccessful campaigns had a mean 
valuation of 26.784 (SD = 24.261). The test showed no statistical difference. We ran a two-
sided t-test with test statistics t(55.91) = -0.31, p = 0.755 (Table 2). 
We also wanted to include one additional result aside from our main research question. By 
running a Welch’s t-test on the investment amount per company, we found that the investment 
amounts in VC transactions (M = 4.364, SD = 4.229) are significantly higher (p<0.01) than 
investment amounts raised through crowdfunding platforms (M = 2.244, SD = 1.531) with 
properties t(176.60) = 3.81, p = 0.000 (Table 2). 
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5 Discussion 
Our findings show that companies that raise capital through crowdfunding platforms attain 
higher valuations on average than companies raising through professional VCs. The average 
crowdfunding valuations were between 44% and 52% higher than the VC valuations in the 
different tests. In the following sections, we examine possible factors that might be underlying 
these results. We begin by discussing how crowdfunded and VC-backed companies might 
differ in relation to the factors affecting startup valuations in the VC method. 
5.1 The Different Factors of Startup Valuation 
Recall that, according to the VC method, startup valuations are a function of the exit value, the 
probability of a successful exit, time to exit, and the investors’ discount rate (formula below). 
To justify higher valuations for crowdfunded companies, they would need to, on average, have 
higher exit valuations, a higher probability of successful exit, a shorter time to exit, or a lower 
investors’ discount rate. 




5.1.1 Exit Valuation 
One of the most important factors determining the potential exit value is the target market size. 
VC firms, in general, like to invest in startups that address large markets, as this increases the 
potential upside of their investment. Some state a good rule of thumb should be to target 
markets with a total market size of at least $500 million to $1 billion, with at least $100 million 
being capturable by the startup in question (Šimić, 2015). Reviewing the crowdfunding 
campaigns, there is nothing suggesting these companies, in general, target larger markets than 
their VC-backed peers. On the contrary, we find some companies that arguably would never 
receive VC funding due to their small target markets. Examples are a local go-kart centre with 
no stated plans for expansion and a local wine bar. In sum, crowdfunded companies do not 
seem to target markets that are larger than those targeted by VC-backed companies; if anything, 
they might be smaller or more local. This suggests that crowdfunded companies should see 
similar or lower valuations than their VC-backed peers. 
There are numerous other factors that impact the exit valuation. Examples are market growth, 
competition, and profitability. We cannot draw any conclusion as to how crowdfunded 
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companies’ target markets differ from those of VC-backed companies across these variables. 
However, it seems unreasonable to assume that crowdfunded companies are significantly better 
at targeting more profitable or less competitive markets. Hence, we would not expect them to 
attain higher valuations due to these factors either. 
5.1.2 Probability of a Successful Exit 
A higher probability of a successful exit will, all else being equal, lead to a higher valuation. 
When reflecting upon this matter, we identified three reasons why crowdfunded companies 
arguably have a lower probability of success. The first, related to adverse selection, is that 
many of these companies have first tried to seek funding prior to the crowdfunding campaign 
but were passed over by all the VCs they approached (Langgård & Mostad, 2015). The CEO 
of a startup we spoke to during our research cancelled the company’s upcoming crowdfunding 
campaign when they found a willing BA, stating that crowdfunding was ‘their last resort’. It 
seems likely that companies that have been rejected by professional investors have a lower 
probability of success. 
The second reason is that VCs might be reluctant to invest in rounds following a crowdfunding 
campaign. A VC GP we spoke to said this was due to two main factors. One is that they are 
suspicious that this company has been passed over by all the investors they approached earlier, 
as evidenced by their need to resort to crowdfunding. Second, she stated that it was tiresome 
having to relate to a vast number of other investors, sometimes exceeding 100, ‘leaving the 
capitalization table as a huge mess’. If prior crowdfunding campaigns deter future investors, 
the company has a lower probability of securing future funding and, consequently, a lower 
probability of reaching a stage where investors can exit successfully. 
The third reason why crowdfunded companies arguably have a lower probability of success is 
that the typical crowdfunding campaign raises significantly less cash than VC rounds. The 
average crowdfunding campaign in our data sample raised NOK 2.244M, compared to NOK 
4.364M in the VC investment rounds. Running out of funds is the second most important reason 
why startups fail (CB Insights, 2019). When raising a lower amount of cash, crowdfunded 
startups have a shorter runway to gain sufficient traction to impress investors enough that they 
will invest in the next round. Consequently, they are more likely to fail. 
However, for a small subset of companies, a successful crowdfunding campaign might be 
interpreted as a signal of higher probability of success. This applies to business-to-consumer 
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companies, where receiving a large number of investors might be interpreted as a validation of 
their products’ quality and attractiveness. 
Other positive factors may exist, but in sum, it seems the negative effects outweigh the positive, 
leaving the crowdfunded companies less likely to succeed than VC-backed companies. All else 
being equal, this should yield lower valuations. 
5.1.3 Time to Exit 
In our analysis, we assumed that the companies in the crowdfunding and VC groups are at 
similar stages. We believe this assumption to be reasonable, so there is no reason to suspect a 
general difference in the time to exit between these groups of companies. Consequently, time 
to exit is unlikely to have any explanatory power as to the difference in valuations between the 
two groups. 
5.1.4 Investors’ Discount Rate 
One fundamental difference between equity crowdfunding and traditional VC structures is the 
distribution of returns. In crowdfunding, investors receive 100% of the returns from successful 
exits. In contrast, the VC fund’s returns are divided between the LPs and GPs, often roughly 
80/20. To compensate for this fee, one might think that LPs require higher returns from the VC 
investments, resulting in a higher discount rate for the VC funds. All else being equal, this 
should lead to lower valuations in VC deals compared to crowdfunding campaigns. Then again, 
one might argue that crowdfunding investors fill the roles of both the LPs and the GPs – they 
both provide the funds and manage the investments. Hence, their efforts should be compensated 
accordingly, levelling their discount rate with that of the LPs. With similar discount rates, we 
should not see significant differences in valuations. 
Another factor that might affect discount rates is the prosocial investment behaviour and desire 
for community benefits seen with crowdfunding investments (Belleflamme et al., 2014). There 
could be several nonmonetary incentives that influence the investors’ utility. They might take 
pleasure in supporting their local wine bar, or perhaps they believe that investing in startups 
boosts their social status at dinner parties. One could think of many such rewards that would 
make investors less preoccupied with returns, effectively lowering their discount rate. This 
would, in turn, lead to higher valuations. However, it seems unlikely that the community 
benefits some startups provide would reduce the discount rate for crowdfunding investors, as 
a group, enough to cause the round 50% increase in valuations we observe in our analysis.  
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Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the average crowdfunding investor is not 
sophisticated enough to take discount rates into account. This notion is supported by research 
we discussed in the literature review indicating that crowdfunding investors are less conscious 
of the valuation when making their investment decisions (Shafi, 2019). Furthermore, we ran a 
test on our data samples and found no significant differences in valuations between the 
successful and unsuccessful crowdfunding campaigns. 
In total, after reviewing the different factors of the VC method, we find insufficient arguments 
to reasonably justify the difference in valuations we observed in our analysis. Thus, we believe 
the difference might occur, at least partially, due to factors outside the valuation model. Two 
such factors might be (i) that VCs face valuation discounts, and (ii) a lack of aligned incentives 
between the crowdfunding platforms and their investors. 
5.2 A Possible Discount for Venture Capitalists 
As discussed in the literature review, VCs and BAs support the startups they invest in with 
more than just money. This support, along with its positive signalling effects, is believed to 
increase a startup’s probability of success. All else being equal, this should increase the 
valuation of the startup today. However, as this value increase is dependent on the investor, 
one might argue that the investor should be able to capture at least some of this additional value 
through a valuation discount. This discount could even reduce the valuation below the 
company’s original valuation while both parties still gain from the arrangement, compared to 
a situation without the value increase. As this is perhaps counterintuitive, we created a simple 
numerical example to illustrate this case, shown in Table 4. This example illustrates why 
startups could be willing to accept lower valuations to gain access to the support of VCs. 
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Scenario A B 
Original valuation 100 100 
VC value increase 0 10 
VC discount 0 20 
VC investment valuation 100 80 
Investment amount 5 5 
VC equity stake 5.00% 6.25% 
Founders equity stake 95.00% 93.75% 
VCs share of final value 5 6.875 
Founders share of final value 95 103.125 
 
The implication of a potential discount is that VCs face lower valuations than crowdfunding 
investors and consequently receive higher returns on their investments. Though we believe this 
factor could play an important role in explaining the observed differences in valuations, we 
believe an equally important factor resides within the existing incentive structures of equity 
crowdfunding. 
5.3 A Lack of Aligned Incentives 
In the common VC structure, LPs invest in companies through the GPs. The carried interest 
ensures that the incentives of the LPs and the GPs are aligned. The GPs have a stake in the 
performance of the investments, as these determine the returns of the fund. Hence, by seeking 
to maximize their own returns, the GPs will simultaneously seek to maximize the returns of the 
LPs. 
In crowdfunding, however, the incentives of the crowdfunding platform are decoupled from 
those of the investors. We believe this could represent a notable issue. The actor facilitating 
the investments has no stake in the performance of the investments. Consequently, to maximize 
returns, at least in the short run, the crowdfunding platforms will seek to maximize the number 
of successful crowdfunding campaigns. To the platform, a successful crowdfunding campaign 
is one that raises enough money to reach the minimum target, not necessarily one that will 
provide risk-adjusted returns to the investors. Furthermore, the platforms have no incentives to 
perform due diligence to filter out poor-quality startups or to negotiate the valuations on behalf 
of the investors. Contrarily, they are incentivized to ensure the satisfaction of the startups. This 
Table 4: Numerical example - VC discount 
26  Discussion 
 
creates a structure where startups choose their own valuations, which the investors cannot 
negotiate, while the crowdfunding platforms collect their fees regardless of the future outcome. 
Some might argue that an important difference between the VC and crowdfunding structure 
lies in who holds the decision-making power. In the case of VCs, the GPs make the investment 
decisions on behalf of the LPs, while in crowdfunding, the investors hold all the decision-
making power themselves. Hence, if they perceive a valuation as unfair, they can simply choose 
not to invest. However, the problem remains if investors take little notice of the valuation when 
making their investment decisions. One might also assume that novice investors place trust in 
the crowdfunding platforms, believing they would not facilitate campaigns for poor-quality 
startups. 
Others could argue that if crowdfunding platforms create campaigns for enough poor-quality 
startups, they will, in the long run, gain negative reputations and have trouble attracting 
investors. However, it would require a substantial amount of research to prove that 
crowdfunding startups in general are of poorer quality than their VC-backed peers. This is due 
to the fact that startup investments are normally quite long-term investments, and they are 
inherently of a high-risk nature. The platforms could likely hide behind these arguments for 
quite some time if faced with disgruntled investors. 
5.3.1 A Possible Solution 
One possible way to solve this problem would be to reorganize the crowdfunding platforms’ 
incentive structures in such a way that they align with the incentives of their investors. An 
example could be to require that the platform invests a part, maybe 10%, of the campaign’s 
target amount, giving them a stake in the performance of the investment. This would 
incentivize the platform to perform a more thorough due diligence and negotiate the 
companies’ valuations. 
5.4 Limitations 
A crucial assumption for our study is that the valuations of crowdfunded and VC-backed 
companies are comparable. For this assumption to hold, several criteria must be met. First, the 
ventures must be at the same stage of development. We defined the stage of the crowdfunded 
companies based on previous funding, which implies a risk of sampling errors. Furthermore, 
some companies might skip a pre-seed round, going straight to the seed round with a higher 
valuation. These companies would be miscategorized if sorted based on previous funding. 
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For the VC deals, we only received anonymized data on investment amounts and valuations. 
Hence, we had to define the stage of VC-backed companies based on these investment 
amounts. Ideally, one would define both groups based on the same criteria, but crowdfunding 
campaigns do, on average, raise lower investment amounts than VC rounds, thus precluding 
this option. In an attempt to overcome this issue, we ran several tests with different stage 
definitions. All these tests yielded statistically significant results showing higher valuations for 
crowdfunded companies. 
Furthermore, our approach assumes that the crowdfunded and VC-backed companies are 
comparable across other important differentiation units. However, there may be systemic 
differences in industries, product categories, or a range of other factors we cannot control for. 
If extensive, these systemic differences might invalidate our results. This challenge is very 
difficult to overcome, as VCs are reluctant to share any information about the companies that 
could make it possible to pinpoint which valuation belongs to which company. To share data 
that is not anonymized, they would have to obtain permission from each portfolio company, 
which few of these companies are willing to give. 
Due to the limited data, we focused on the theoretical framework of the VC method throughout 
our thesis. Although this is a widely acknowledged approach, it would undoubtedly have been 
beneficial to supplement our analysis and subsequent discussion with other theoretical 
frameworks if the data allowed. 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first comparing valuations between 
crowdfunded and VC-backed companies. Thus, it would be interesting to see if the results are 
replicable, especially in other countries where the equity crowdfunding market might be more 
mature. While the Norwegian crowdfunding platforms, Dealflow and Folkeinvest, were 
founded in 2017 and 2015, respectively, a UK-based platform, Crowdcube, was founded in 
2010 and has more than 1,100 successfully completed campaigns. Hence, we might see 
different results in the more mature UK market. On the other hand, Crowdcube uses a similar 
fee structure as the Norwegian platforms, implying that the same misaligned incentives remain 
(Crowdcube. 2020). 
If crowdfunded companies are overvalued, this result is interesting, first and foremost, because 
it implies that investors will achieve inferior risk-adjusted returns. However, to determine if 
this holds true, it is necessary with a direct comparison of the actual returns on investing in 
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equity crowdfunding compared to venture capital. In Norway, the market is still too young to 
yield data on the development of crowdfunded companies, but this might be possible in more 
mature markets, for instance, in the UK. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we sought to determine if equity crowdfunded companies are overvalued. In our 
analysis, we assumed that crowdfunded companies are closely comparable to VC-backed 
companies and should, consequently, have similar valuations. We used Welch’s t-tests to 
compare the valuations in these two groups, both with and without attempts to define the 
startups as being in different stages. 
All our results indicate that crowdfunded companies on average attain higher valuations than 
their VC-backed peers. The average crowdfunding valuations were between 44% and 52% 
higher than the VC valuations in the different tests. Throughout our discussion, we have 
postulated that there is a lack of compelling arguments that could logically explain why we 
observe higher valuations for crowdfunded companies. On the contrary, we argue that any 
difference in valuations should likely fall in favour of the VC-backed companies, as these 
appear to have higher potential and chances of success. Consequently, our analysis and 
subsequent reasoning lead us to the conclusion that crowdfunded companies do indeed appear 
to be overvalued. 
We theorize that these overvaluations might be due to two main factors. The first is that VCs 
face a valuation discount, as their support can increase the future value of the startups. The 
second factor is the dynamics of the crowdfunding platforms, where startups can choose their 
own valuations and the platforms lack incentives to negotiate this valuation on behalf of the 
investors. We believe the lack of aligned incentives between the crowdfunding platforms and 
the investors represents a major, though not unsolvable, problem. 
If crowdfunded companies are overvalued, that is not earth-shatteringly interesting in itself. 
However, the implication that equity crowdfunding might systematically yield inferior risk-
adjusted returns as compared to venture capital investments is, arguably, very interesting. If 
this holds true, crowdfunding does not hold its proclaimed power to reduce societal 
inequalities. On the contrary, it might prove to be an unfruitful undertaking for naive, 
unprofessional investors. Though additional research is necessary to support our findings and 
their implications, the industry-wide scarcity of available data on this topic makes research 
challenging. Therefore, conclusive results might not be available in the near future. In the 
meantime, we recommend that crowdfunding investors exert critical judgement and take note 
of company valuations in their investment decisions. If they do not, they might overpay. 
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